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EASTMED

Eastern Mediterranean Regional Training Partnership

Strategic Partnerships



Eastmed Course Catalogue



Πανεπιστήμιο Πειραιώς
University of Piraeus

Τμήμα Διεθνών &
Ευρωπαϊκών Σπουδών
Department of International &
European Studies



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EASTMED MOOC "EU AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES" MODULES

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1ST MODULE - THE REGION OF EASTERNMEDITERRANEAN

COORDINATOR: PROF. Aristotle TZIAMPIRIS (UNIPi)

INTRODUCTION TO THE MODULE

The Eastern Mediterranean is becoming increasingly more important in international politics and hence requires further study and elaboration. The Eastern Mediterranean is a dynamic regional subsystem with developments on several issues that have substantial global and regional ramifications, in this class we will focus on them. Moreover, the Eastern Mediterranean is becoming a big "laboratory" where balance of power policies, antagonisms and cooperative initiatives among Great Powers and regional states are both attempted and tested and in this class, we focus on these actors as well.

UNIT 1 – THE NEW REGION OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Lecturer: Prof. Aristotle Tziampiris

Class Description:

This class will delineate first the concept of a region and argue how and why the Eastern Mediterranean should be viewed as a new "region" for the international relations on the 21st century. The characteristics and parameters of a regional subsystem will thus be discussed first, followed by their specific application to the Eastern Mediterranean.

Learning Objectives:

The concept of regions is encased in substantial ambiguity and disagreement. Nevertheless, acknowledging the existence of disagreements and difficulties and even the necessity for a small degree of intellectual arbitrariness, does not excuse us from efforts to attempt to define regional subsystems. There are several advantages to delineating them. First, regions are becoming a more useful analytical concept for the international relations of the 21st century. Secondly, correctly identifying regions can permit decision-makers to pursue advantageous initiatives, especially since the world is simply too diverse for "one size fits all" policies like that of containment in the past. Furthermore, the possibility opens for the creative and productive cooperation among I.R. and area studies scholars in both theoretical and empirical endeavors. Finally, the concept of a region allows for more elegant and concentrated academic approaches. Not everything can or should be covered and analyzed. Similar to the role of a theory, a properly defined region can help us determine us which issues to ignore and which issues to concentrate upon

Theory:

Regions are becoming even more consequential for international politics since most of economic, military and diplomatic interactions take place at the regional level. As a result, proximity matters. Many countries that count for little or not much at the global level have a much greater impact on their neighbors. Nevertheless, despite their increasing significance, regions have not really received the kind of academic attention that they deserve. One of the reasons of this is that the concept of regions is certainly encased in ambiguity and disagreement about their magnitude, limits, characteristics or required level of cohesion.

Still, it is very important to delineate the regions for several reasons. First, regions are becoming a very useful analytical concept for the international relations of the 21st century. Secondly, correctly identified regions can permit decision makers to pursue advantageous initiatives. Finally, the concept of the region allows more elegant and concentrated academic approaches.

Instead of coming up with just one controversial definition, we should have just an approach to what are the major parameters that define a region. First, when we define a region the first inevitable parameter must be geographical, and more specifically, we have to delineate its geographical and political state limits which do not necessarily coincide. Then again, we must determine if this region includes some core and/ or peripheral states, a fact which is dynamic in time. Secondly, regions have a security dimension. In security terms, regions are distinct and significant sub-system of security relations which exists among a set of states characterized by geographical proximity. Third, regions are characterized by a specific degree of cohesion. Regional cohesion can be understood in two senses: when the region plays a defining role in the relations between the states and other major actors, and when the region forms the organizing basis for policy within the region across a range of issues. Furthermore, we can distinguish between external recognition, which refers to the rest of the world's view of a region, and internal recognition, which stems from the states within the region. Fourth, regions are usually defined by a common historical background which leads usually to cultural commonalities and creates common points of reference. The fifth parameter is the potential existence of extended economic relations that it may also lead to the economic interdependence. Finally, regions may enjoy certain unique characteristics that provide an important commonality to the countries that compose it but may be completely irrelevant or absent to other regions.

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UNIT 2 – KEY ACTORS IN THE REGION

Lecturer: Prof. Aristotle Tziampiris

Class Description:

At this historical juncture, given their regional initiatives and significance to regional developments, the core countries of the East Mediterranean are probably Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel and Turkey. To these states, the policy preferences of the USA, the EU and Russia should also be taken into account. This class will focus on the key cooperative efforts and contested issues among them.

Learning Objectives:

We will understand the exact issues and ways in which cooperation and confrontation exists pursued among these states.

Theory:

The Eastmed includes the states of Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Syria and Turkey which are mainly the core states of Eastern Mediterranean. To these someone may add some non-recognised “states” such as the Islamic State, the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Gaza. Even more, some states have been treated as “honorary” Eastern Mediterranean states such as Jordan and the Palestinian authority.

The states of Eastmed show a great degree of cohesion, although significant disparities do exist. As regards the regions external dimension, the fact that we have so many policy initiatives such as the Eastmed pipeline proves that the world is increasingly seeing the Eastmed as a distinct vital region. Moreover, the Eastmed has very strong regional characteristics. It shares a common modern historical background of wars, revolutions, imperialism and diasporas, all of which compose common historical and cultural points of reference. Furthermore, there is some degree of economic activity and some form of moderate economic interdependence. Finally, the Eastern Mediterranean has a unique characteristic. Specifically, the Eastmed should be regarded as border between the East and the West. As a result, we can conclude that the Eastern Mediterranean constitutes a distinct regional sub- system with modern cohesion and economic interdependence, shares a common historical background, high internal and lesser external recognition, operates as a border between East and West and has substantial security significance for contemporary international politics.

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UNIT 3 – KEY ISSUES IN THE REGION

Lecturer: Prof. Aristotle Tziampiris

Class Description:

The Eastern Mediterranean is experiencing some of the most intriguing, worrisome and dangerous events in contemporary international politics. They include the brutal civil war raging in Syria; the rise (and now apparent decline) of ISIS; the gradual unraveling of Libya that has become a divided, weak state flirting with becoming a failed one; the outbreak of Islamic sectarian conflicts throughout the region; the uncertainty about Egypt's future (and that of the Arab Spring more generally), the persistent regional ambitions (and rising authoritarianism) of Turkey; and, more recently, a refugee crisis involving millions that has affected not only regional states but also the domestic politics of several European states and quite possibly the very nature and future of European integration.

Learning Objectives:

This class will focus on the cooperation and confrontation potentials relating to the regional energy findings, will pay attention to the refugee crisis and also take into account the regional security issues that include Islamic terrorism and ferocious sectarian clashes.

Theory:

a. What are the big issues and the big states of the region?

The Eastern Mediterranean is a region in flux, in transition and in turmoil. It is a region whose future has not yet been decided. One of the most interesting developments is the return of Russia in the region which is a state consequential for the Eastern Mediterranean. Russia has intervened militarily in the civil war in Syria, an intervention which tipped the scale in the region. Russia has now an air base in Attakia and a naval base in Tartus, Syria, which confirms Russia's military presence in the region. Russia has also military and trade agreements with Egypt, Cyprus and Greece. Currently, Russia has very good relations with Turkey which has missile and trade agreements. As a result, when we think the Eastmed region we have to take into account Russia which is a "new" but very significant actor in the region. Turkey is not just one of the core countries of the Eastern Mediterranean. However, Turkey has been turning more and more authoritarian. Turkey, a NATO member since 1952, has becoming a less reliable ally for NATO and US because of an important divergence of perceived interests. Turkey has been currently confronted with the existential threat of the emergence of a Kurdish state in Syria because of which it intervened militarily in Syria. Consequently, we do not know at the moment if Turkey will be a factor of stability and cooperation or a lever of instability and confrontation in the area. China has also been an important economic player since it maintains significant investments in the region.

The United States remains by far the most powerful actor in Eastern Mediterranean both militarily and financially. However, the United States has been less and less interested in intervening militarily and engage actively in Eastern Mediterranean, at least up until now.

Moreover, we have a quartet of states closely cooperating in the region. Within this framework, Greece, Cyprus and Israel as well as Greece, Cyprus and Egypt have been strongly cooperating in economic, security, tourism and other sectors. This two trilateral cooperation frames have been an important new success story.

b. What are the main issues affecting the region?

Among the many issues developed in the Eastern Mediterranean, the refugee crisis does predominate. Since the beginning of the civil war in Syria, more than 5 million people have been displaced. Having created a huge humanitarian and political crisis, Syrian refugees have been fled to Turkey or Europe. Specifically, more than 1.5 million refugees have entered EU through the Eastern Mediterranean route. The refugee crisis has led to a major political crisis in EU, to the rise of nationalism and populism. A second important issue has been the state fragmentation and the economic crisis that many of the Eastmed states are facing. States such as Greece, Cyprus and Egypt are confronted with major financial problems and high unemployment rates. At the same time, many Eastmed states are rather weak or disintegrating. For instance, Libya is at least three states at the moment while Syria is at civil war. Political situation in Egypt is rather fragile because of percolating discontent.

A third fundamental issue tormenting the region is the increase of Islamic terrorism. We can not understand Eastmed wars without considering the clashes of Shia and Sunni Islamists such as in the case of Syria. Moreover, the Islamic State, the name of which connotes its ambition, controls a part of Syria and a small part of Iraq. The Islamic state's power seem to receding but its terrorist initiatives have not decreased. The fourth important issue of the energy sources of the Eastmed region. Both gas and oil resources have been evidently found in Eastern Mediterranean and, specifically, in states such as Israel, Cyprus and Egypt. History has taught us that energy findings can be a potential source of cooperation but also a potential source of confrontation.

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2ND MODULE - EU - EASTERNMEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS

COORDINATOR: PROF. SHARON PARDO (BGU)

UNIT 1 – EUROPEAN COMMON FOREIGN POLICY / NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY

Lecturer: Prof. Sharon Pardo

Class Description:

The study of the European Union's (EU) relations with the Middle East and the Mediterranean is of a particular interest mainly because it reflects what has been faced by the EU in gradually establishing the Union's position in external relations and its foreign policy mechanism. The Middle East was on the agenda of the first meeting of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) and has remained there ever since. The Union's behavior vis-à-vis the conflicts in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean reflects to a large degree the conditions under which the EU developed its actorness. In light of this, the module serves as an analysis of the EU as an international actor, as well as an analysis, of the Union's relations to the Middle East and the Mediterranean. This module analyses the relationships between the EU, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean from the early 1950s to the present day. The course then deals with the EU Middle East/Mediterranean relations between 1991 and 2009. The third part of the course reflects on some of the most central issues and challenges facing the EU, the Middle East and the Mediterranean today. This unit provides an introduction with the complex relations that the EU has with the Eastern Mediterranean region.

Learning Objectives (distinguishing knowledges, competences, critical eye):

1. The student will gain a greater understanding of the EU's foreign policy and neighborhood policy
2. The student will be able to classify different program within the EU's foreign policy and their implantation to the EastMed region

Study Guide:

Crisis follows a crisis: During this period, the ME and the Mediterranean saw everything: war, peace and hopes for peace. Until 1989, one crisis immediately followed another.

Behind all these crisis was the fundamental ideological rift between the US and the USSR.

If the ME was the play ground of the two superpowers what was then the role of the EC?

Three frameworks to examine the EU's policy towards the ME: We should examine the European policies towards the ME and the Mediterranean under three different, though interlinked frameworks:

****The 3 frameworks of the EC policy towards the ME****

The Middle East Peace Process

The Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP)



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The Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) and the EC-Gulf Dialogue (EGD)

The EPC and the ME 1969-1973

The EC member states held different views regarding the Middle East and as already discussed, even during and after the 1967 War, the member states could not reach a common position.

The EPC was one of the first topics on the agenda of the EPC: The first EPC meeting took place in Munich in November 1970. The important subjects on the agenda of the first EPC meeting were: (i) the European Security Conference ahead of the 1973 Helsinki Conference; and (ii) the problem of the ME, where the aim was to prepare a common position. The second EPC meeting was held in Paris in May 1971. The meeting centered around the situation in the ME and the participants confirmed their approval of UNSCR 242 and declared their willingness to contribute to the social and economic stabilization of the ME.

The 'Schuman secret report': The most noticeable result of the first meetings of the EPC in the early 1970s, before the energy crisis of 1973, was the 'Schuman secret report', on the Arab-Israeli conflict in May 1971. The Schuman document marked the beginning of coordinated EPC positions on the ME problem. The status of the Schuman Report was uncertain. France considered the report as an official policy, but the Netherlands objected the report and the Germans and the Italians had their reservations regarding the report and they described it as an informal working paper.

****The 1971 Schuman Secret Report included****

- The establishment of demilitarised zones, in which international forces would be stationed;
- The overall Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories with minor border adjustments;
- The internationalisation of Jerusalem;
- The postponement of any conclusive solution regarding the sovereignty of East Jerusalem;
- The choice, for the 'Arab refugees' of either returning to their home or being indemnified;
- The approval of the Jarring mission (January 1971).

The Schuman report was more important internally than externally: Although the report did not add anything new to UNSCR 242, it constituted an important step in laying down the EC attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Schuman report represented the first Community joint position on the ME dispute. The Report managed impressively to harmonize the development of the positions of each member state at the beginning of the 1970, and brought them together for the first time.

In January 1973 three new member states join the EC – the UK, Denmark and Ireland. The membership of the new countries did not improve the coherence among the EC members.

**** Member States' Positions at the Outbreak of the October 1973 War****

Members States' Positions at the Outbreak of the October 1973 War: At the outbreak of the October 1973 war, the EC was divided into three blocks: the pro-Arab block (France and Italy), a neutral block (Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg and perhaps the UK), and a pro-Israeli bloc (Denmark, West Germany and the NL).

The Arab Oil Embargo and the Increase in the Price of Crude Oil

Utilizing the oil as a political weapon in the Arab struggle with Israel: In the wake of the 1973 war two separate yet interconnected developments took place: the decision by the Arab oil-producing countries to impose a general production cut-back and a selective embargo on exports to some countries; the decision taken by OPEC (The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) to increase the price of crude oil.

** OPEC **

In other words, the Arab boycott or call it cut-back or embargo, implied the idea of utilizing the oil as a political weapon in the Arab struggle with Israel.

Kuwait calls a meeting: Kuwait was the first country to call for a meeting of the OAPEC – The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, in order to draw up a common policy on how the Arab oil could be best used in the battle. The meeting took place on 17 October 1973.

** OAPEC **

OAPEC decided to cut their oil production: During their 17 October 1973 meeting, the oil ministers of the OAPEC countries decided to cut their monthly oil production by a minimum of 5% from the September 1973 level (with effect from October) until Israel will withdraw its forces from all Arab territories it occupied in 1967 and until the legitimate rights of the Palestinians are restored. The ministers also said that they will continue with this cut until the oil production of each OAPEC member will reach a situation in which its economy could not allow further reduction without serious damage.

Arab Oil Ministers divided the EC: The Oil ministers further decided to divide states into three categories: Friendly States, Neutral States, and Hostile States. The Arab countries simply divided the EC member states into these three categories:

** The Arab Oil Embargo **

Friendly or most favored nations: France and the UK – No sanctions were imposed.

Neutral Countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg – the 5% cut-back sanction was applied.

Hostile Countries: the Netherlands (because of its pro-Israel position) and the USA – a total boycott was imposed.

Europe felt that its economic security and its very existence were directly threatened: When the 1973 War broke out and the Arabs employed their oil as a political weapon, Europe felt

that its economic security and its very existence were directly threatened. This resulted in a serious crisis within the EC, as well as within NATO.

The 1973 war and the oil embargo were a catalyst for many developments concerning the European integration process: The oil embargo made Europeans brutally aware of their vulnerability in both economic and political terms; it changed the patterns of relationships with both Israel and the Arab world, and brought about a dramatic shift towards more pro-Arab attitudes; it revealed the extent of European external disunity and generated calls for more integration as a result of this experience; it had economic effects not imaginable before the crisis; and, last but not least, it brought to the surface the uneasy nature of Euro-American relations.

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UNIT 2 – EU BILATERAL RELATIONS

Lecturer: Prof. Sharon Pardo

Class Description:

This unit will underline the EU-EastMed bilateral relations from 1959 onwards, until present days. As the EU-EastMed relations deepen, so does the impact of the EU in the region is increasing. This unit seeks to provide a rich and complex analysis of the unique bilateral relationship between the EU, its expanses and the East Mediterranean, both as a region and as sovereign countries

Learning Objectives (distinguishing knowledges, competences, critical eye):

- a. The student will be able to classify, map and analyses the history of the bilateral relations between the EU and the EastMed region
- b. The student will be able to understand to complexity and criticism of those agreements.

Study Guide:

Crisis follows a crisis: During this period, the ME and the Mediterranean saw everything: war, peace and hopes for peace. Until 1989, one crisis immediately followed another.

Behind all these crisis was the fundamental ideological rift between the US and the USSR.

If the ME was the play ground of the two superpowers what was then the role of the EC?

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The 'Schuman secret report': The most noticeable result of the first meetings of the EPC in the early 1970s, before the energy crisis of 1973, was the 'Schuman secret report', on the Arab-Israeli conflict in May 1971. The Schuman document marked the beginning of coordinated EPC positions on the ME problem. The status of the Schuman Report was uncertain. France considered the report as an official policy, but the Netherlands objected the report and the Germans and the Italians had their reservations regarding the report and they described it as an informal working paper.

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In January 1973 three new member states join the EC – the UK, Denmark and Ireland. The membership of the new countries did not improve the coherence among the EC members.

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Hostile Countries: the Netherlands (because of its pro-Israel position) and the USA – a total boycott was imposed.

Europe felt that its economic security and its very existence were directly threatened: When the 1973 War broke out and the Arabs employed their oil as a political weapon, Europe felt that its economic security and its very existence were directly threatened. This resulted in a serious crisis within the EC, as well as within NATO.

The 1973 war and the oil embargo were a catalyst for many developments concerning the European integration process: The oil embargo made Europeans brutally aware of their vulnerability in both economic and political terms; it changed the patterns of relationships with both Israel and the Arab world, and brought about a dramatic shift towards more pro-Arab attitudes; it revealed the extent of European external disunity and generated calls for more integration as a result of this experience; it had economic effects not imaginable before the crisis; and, last but not least, it brought to the surface the uneasy nature of Euro-American relations.

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UNIT 3 – EU TOOLS & INSTRUMENTS TOWARDS EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Lecturer: Prof. Sharon Pardo

Class Description:

This unit will aim to provide the students with comprehensive analysis, synthesis and critique regarding the EU actions and power imposed on the EastMed region. In this unit we will underline crucial political concepts based on IR theoretical thinker such as Josef Nye, François Duchêne, etc. By this analysis we will try to uncover the tools and instruments implemented toward the EastMed region.

Learning Objectives (distinguishing knowledges, competences, critical eye):

- a. The student will be able to differentiate between the different tools implemented towards the EastMed region.
- b. The student will gain critical analysis tools on the topic of EU-EastMed relations.
- c. The students will be able to classify and categorize political reforms and their link to the diffusion of European norms and values in the EastMed region.

Study Guide:

Despite the evolution of positions there was no concrete European peace initiative in 1979: It is clear that between 1970-1979 the EPC positions slowly embraced most of the Arab demands on the Palestinian problem. Nonetheless despite this evolution of positions there was no concrete European peace initiative in 1979.

A purposeful European collective approach: As we entered the 1980s, however, the diplomatic coordination of the member states on the ME conflict began taking the form of a purposeful European collective behaviour.

The Community's relations with the Middle Eastern countries improved considerably as a result of bilateral and multilateral relations: By 1980 the member states had accumulated almost ten years' diplomatic experience in the ME and vis a vis other international problems.

The EC appeared to many Arab states as a useful alternative diplomatic option to the superpowers: As the Community's positions became more concrete, and as the Camp David peace process proved disappointing for the relevant countries, the EC appeared to many Arab states as a useful alternative diplomatic option to the superpowers. The dissatisfaction of many Arab states with the American policies in the ME, gave rise to expectations that Europe could lead the way to a more balanced approach. The contribution of Europe, as the Arabs saw it, would take place through direct bilateral pressures on the US, and through declarations which could make the Americans more sensible, and by that forcing them to seek new options.

Modifying Resolution 242- Moving towards the PLO: In 1979, the EC declared that the ME needs a comprehensive peace and that the Community attached great importance to resuming the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD). In March 1980, the member states voted for a UN Resolution condemning the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories with France, the UK and Germany making declarations in favour of the PLO.

The member states acted within the limits defined by the EPC: In 1979-1980, the EC member states managed to commit themselves to a particularly intensive diplomatic interplay which was sustained until the Venice meeting. Either individually or in consultation with each other through the EPC, the member states acted within the limits defined by the EPC. The member states, by and large, confined their positions within the limits defined by their EPC ME declarations. The EPC was seen as a useful diplomatic forum in the pursuance of both community collective objectives and national goals.

A clear division of labour: The member states had a clear division of labour: France was more daring than the others in advancing new statements, mainly due to its position as an independently-minded country. Germany worked towards the US with which it had friendly bilateral relations and with the Arab states, mainly Egypt, with which it maintained special economic and political relations. Britain, which also had good relations with the US tried to persuade the Americans to amend Resolution 242 and to pursue a more far-reaching approach towards the Palestinian problem.

The Venice Declaration of June 1980

The Venice declaration did not go as far as some had expected: The declaration of the heads of state or government meeting in the European Council in Venice on 12 and 13 June 1980, produced the new EC declaration, which did not go as far as some had expected. However, the Venice declaration was both a landmark and the highest level of collective European ME diplomatic involvement.

The central parts of the Venice declarations: The central parts of the Venice declaration are points 6-9 and the major issues it discusses are: (i) the Palestinian problem, (ii) the status of Jerusalem, (iii) the question of the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.

****Venice Declaration, 13/06/1980 (I-IV)****

Europe gave notice of its aspirations to play a greater role in the Arab-Israeli conflict: The Venice declaration outlined a number of principles which have defined Europe's vision towards the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ever since. These principles were not a radical departure in European thinking. Rather, they crystallized positions that had evolved gradually over the previous decade. The declaration asserted that it was imperative that a just resolution be found to the Palestinian problem, and that this issue should not be viewed as simply a refugee problem. In the eyes of the Nine (member states), a just and lasting solution to the conflict demanded that "the Palestinian people be allowed to exercise fully its rights to self determination."

The declaration also outlined the diplomatic steps needed to be taken in order to achieve a lasting resolution of the Palestinian question: In addition to spelling out what was required for a viable solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Europeans castigated Israel for its settlement policy, and they also warned Israel over its policy in Jerusalem. The Venice declaration also outlined the diplomatic steps needed to be taken in order to achieve a lasting resolution of the Palestinian question. Specifically, and to the anger of Israel, it called for the inclusion of the PLO in any future negotiating process aimed at resolving the conflict.

Venice cast a large shadow over Israeli-European relations throughout the 1980s. From the issuing of the declaration in June 1980 to the convening of the Madrid peace conference in November 1991, Israel vigorously opposed any European attempt to play a significant role in the peace process.

The US reaction: In the US within hours of the Venice declaration, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie's released low-key comments.

****Secretary of State Edmund Muskie (Ed), 13/06/1980****

The US reaction was polite, and avoided openly confronting the logic of its transatlantic allies, despite the fact that later on the US systematically obstructed the follow up of the Venice initiative.

Venice declarations conclusions

It is true that all the criticisms that the Venice declarations received were all correct. Venice did not go so far as to recognize the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, it did stipulate a rather insecure guarantee for Israel and it did not interfere with the Camp David agreement.

EC positions evolved considerably and became pro-Arab: The positions of the EC member states, both collectively and individually, evolved considerably from the early 1970s and became pro-Arab.

Resolution 242 became an open call for Palestinian self-determination: In the 1980s the EC reference to Resolution 242 became an open call for Palestinian self-determination.

The fact that the Nine pooled their potential, created an image of strength: this image influenced the European actors themselves and encouraged them in being active and daring. Thus, to the extent that image in international relations is as important as anything else, a collective view by the nine European states creates a certain legitimacy which puts the opponents of this view on the defensive (this was not the case with Israel).

The possibility of hiding behind a collective policy statement: Venice is proof that the possibility of hiding behind a collective policy statement makes things easier for certain EC members. This is particularly true for Germany (because of its special relations with Israel and with the Arab states). For the other countries as well, political cooperation is a source of domestic and international legitimacy.

The EC's positions differ from Israeli positions on almost all points: The EC member states did not consult or took little account of Israel's views on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Certainly, they always referred Israel's right to secure borders (i.e. modifications to the 1967 borders), however the EC's positions differ from Israel's on almost all other points. It should be clear that the Venice Declaration was not geared towards balancing direct relations with both the Arabs and Israel. Hence, while the US maintains direct relations with both the Arabs and the Israelis, the Europeans in the Venice initiative put much more attention on their links with the Arab side than with the Israelis.

The Regan Plan 1982: On 1 September 1982, U.S. president Ronald Reagan issued a policy statement in the wake of Israel's June 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the expulsion of the PLO and about 15,000 PLO fighters from Lebanon. Regan issued this policy statement following extensive mediation by US special envoy Philip Habib. In his speech Reagan expressed satisfaction that Lebanon's troubles were over and turned his attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Regan Plan is based on the Camp David Agreement and it included the following points:

****The Reagan Plan, 1/9/1982****

Total autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza populations in association with Jordan;

Free elections of Palestinian authorities in these areas;

A freeze of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories; and

A gradual transfer of authority to the elected Palestinian authority.

Throughout the 1980s the EC positions did little to advance the Community's ambitions of playing a significant role in the ME: Why? 1. The Community's pro-Arab stance prevented it from being taken seriously by Israel as a serious mediator in the conflict; 2. The EC did not have the capacity and the influence to bring the parties to the negotiating table.

Only after the end of the Cold War the EC was able to come up with some serious peace proposals.

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3RD MODULE - EU-EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN: THE REFUGEE CHALLENGE

COORDINATORS: PROF. SARA DE VIDO (UNIVE), PROF. IVANA PADOAN (UNIVE)

INTRODUCTION TO THE MODULE

The unit will explore, using an inter disciplinary lens, the refugee challenge in Europe. It highlights the major socio-political elements, investigates the main legal issues, and proposes concrete examples of integration, which might be useful for the entire Eastmed region.

UNIT 1 – EU POLICIES ON MIGRATION & GOVERNANCE

Class no. 1, Critical Understanding of Key Categories in the Asylum and Migration Field

Lecturer : dr. Iside Gjergji

Class Description:

More than 65 million people are forcibly displaced across the globe, as refugees, asylum seekers, or internally displaced persons. Never have so many people been on the move for reasons beyond their free will. Conflicts and crises are an immediate trigger; however, the migration challenge has deeper roots: underlying trends in social inequalities, climate change and demographics are all playing a part in the record numbers of international migrants worldwide.

A deep combination of political and economic reasons is now featuring this new migration era. From a social and sociological point of view, it has become difficult to distinguish between refugees and migrants. Not by coincidence, the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ are frequently used interchangeably in media and public discourse. But is there a difference between the two, and does it matter? What are the social consequences?

This class is designed to introduce students to key issues related to asylum, international protection and migration. Built on a socio-legal perspective, it will mostly define what migration and ‘forced migration’ are, both intended as social and global phenomena, through key categories such as: asylum, international migration, international protection, asylum seeker, displaced people, border, migration governance, migration laws, etc.

Topics: Definition of: Refugee, Asylum Seeker, Person Eligible for «Subsidiary protection», Displaced Person, Economic Migrant. Connections between concepts and categories.

Learning Objectives:

- To be able to understand contemporary debates around migration, asylum and international protection;
- To develop a critical understanding of key categories in the asylum and migration field;
- To understand the legal differences (and social consequences) between ‘migration’ and ‘forced migration’.

Class no. 2, Towards new forms of Migration Governance

Lecturer: prof. Ivana Padoan

Class Description:

Europe since its foundation, in 1957, was promoted by the 6 founding countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Europe is a place of union, dialogue, peace and growth, respecting the diversity of the countries that they compose it. If the first commitments were to work together to resolve post-war conflicts with the force of law, and dialogue instead of military conflict, then with the following treaties, in particular the treaty of Maastricht on the European Union, Europe has encountered the problem of how to further protect its borders. With the evolution of a more global international economic and financial system and more advanced technological communication, Europe has faced the problem of how European countries can collaborate in view of a broader and open union for those who travel, study and work in other countries. In recent years, after the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, Europe intends to strengthen democratic principles and the protection of fundamental rights by sharing responsibilities between the European Union and the member states. In addition, Europe has recently faced several challenges: financial crisis, economic crisis, banking crisis, social crisis, terrorism, destabilizing the structure and the social context in continuous movement and integration.

The last challenge is linked to the flow of new migrations, which are no longer only internal, meaning between the different EU countries (28 before Brexit), but also they concern the flows of migrants from outside the area (asylum seekers, refugees, illegal migrants). Italy, together with Greece and Malta, is suffering more than other countries of the European Union, the burden of this situation which is no longer to be considered an emergency but has become a structural form of human existence and mobility.

The European Union at this event has presented itself strongly divided and disunited. It has refused to accept migrants, it has fixed quotas of selected migrants, it has faced challenges such as withdrawal from the Union (Brexit), it has built new walls along the borders ...

To avoid deep internal crises, it will be necessary to find a new form of governance: through new collaborations, strategies and paths, through new regulations among partners, new formulations of responsibility, recognition of fundamental rights, job promotion, training, housing support, protection and social well-being, in a system today crossed by flows (techoscape, mediascape, financialscape, ideoscape, ethnoscape), which deconstruct and restructure places, ideas, legitimacy, responsibility, economies and freedom between the local and the global.

Topics: World Flows and Migration; to find a New Form of Governance; Defining European Agenda; the New World Challenge.

Learning Objectives:

- Know and understand the fundamental elements of European policies towards 2025
- Applying knowledge and understanding: Ability to understand how European policies and individual states include or exclude the migration process
- Making judgements: Critical capacity relative to the policies of the individual states regarding the migration processes
- Communication skills: Ability to search for systemic information, to discuss, to compare the proposals and solutions of the various European countries in a comparative manner
- Learning skills: Ability of how learn to learn. Recognizing one's own learning and that of others, the ability to overcome one's own point of view, metacognitive capacity

Class no. 3, Understanding migration processes into Europe and the Mediterranean Region

Lecturer: prof. Pietro Basso

Class Description:

“The Age of Migration” is the phrase chosen by Stephen Castles and M.J. Miller (2009) to describe our era, and it could not be more appropriate. It stands for the international dimension of migration and refers to the post-war period from 1945 to present. Indeed, this period is distinguished from an earlier period of still-significant international migration – that of 1850 to 1914 – because migration has become a truly global process. This global characteristic differentiates contemporary migration from all other “voluntary” or forced migrations in the past. It is a permanent and long-term phenomenon with enormous economic, social, political, cultural, and personal consequences both on emigration and immigration countries. It is both a product of and a factor in epoch-making changes.

A few basic figures help underscore the size and development of the phenomenon. From 1950 to 2005 world population more than doubled from 2.5 to over 6 billion. Over the same period the number of international emigrants of all types (‘economic migrants’, asylum seekers, ecological migrants, displaced persons, etc.) more than tripled from 60 million to 200 million. The gap between these two processes is likely to widen over the next thirty to forty years. According to projections by the International Organization for Migration, the world population is likely to reach 9 billion in 2050 (30% greater than now), while the number of international emigrants is set to double reaching over 400 million (IOM, 2011).

Europe and the Mediterranean region have been crossed by major migratory movements in recent years, thus becoming central places where new migration policies and governance are being experienced.

This class is designed to examine the root causes of international migration phenomenon and the contradictory effects of the European crisis and its policies on migration.

Topics: Migration as Long Term Phenomenon with several Consequences; Understanding Root Causes of Migration and contradictions of Migratory EU policies.

Learning Objectives:

- To be able to analyse contemporary debates around migration phenomenon and migration policies;
- To understand migration processes and become acquainted with different theoretical approaches;
- To develop an understanding of historical processes of migration into Europe and the Mediterranean region.

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Class no. 4, Migration and the security perspective

Lecturer : Dr. Iside Gjergji, Centre for Social Studies- Coimbra University, Stanford University

Class Description

The issue of migration policy most frequently characterized by security approach is irregular migration control – understood as policies to exclude irregular migrants through restrictions, border control, detention and deportation. The management of the European Union’s external borders is the area in which the European Union has taken the most evident and important measures. Since the establishment of the Schengen System, - based on Schengen Convention, which is the main EU legal document dealing with border security - the development of a joint management of the EU’s external borders has become a priority on the concerned EU member states. In term of management instrument, a set of centralized databases has been established, including the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS) and the European database for information sharing (EURODAC), as well as the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX).

Learning Objectives:

- To be able to understand contemporary debates around security perspective;
- To develop a critical understanding of key issues on the security perspective;
- To understand the connections between the security perspective and European Migrants Policies.

UNIT 2 –HUMAN RIGHTS & REFUGEE STATUS

Class no. 1 The Common European Asylum System

Lecturer: Dr. Pietro Sullo, University of Kent, Bruxelles School of International Studies

Class Description:

The recent tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea and the pressure on EU borders have pushed EU leaders to discuss the possibility of a reviewing the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). However, the 2015 EU Agenda on Migration is based on a full and effective implementation of the existing system rather than on an in-depth review aimed at addressing its structural deficiencies. Moreover, the relocation mechanism, the so-called hotspots approach and the EU-Turkey Statement have triggered serious human rights concerns. The load put on frontline countries, the possibility for refugees to work only in the country granting asylum and the non-homogeneous standards of reception and protection offered by EU MS triggered further criticisms. Despite the introduction of some guarantees for asylum seekers, the most controversial piece of the CEAS remains the Dublin III Regulation. The latter is applied inconsistently throughout EU Member States (MS), which negatively impacts the standards of life and integration opportunities of asylum seekers. Based on research which takes into account the case law of the ECtHR and CJEU, as well as on empirical research including interviews with protection’s seekers, staff of the Dublin units and of NGOs between the end of 2015 and the first half of 2017, my presentation provides an overview of the implementation of the Dublin III Regulation throughout the EU Member States. In the light of the results gathered I discuss the proposal by the European Commission to set up a ‘Dublin IV’ Regulation and possible alternatives, stressing, where necessary, possibilities for overhauling

in the light of human rights best practices and the principle of solidarity and fairness affirmed in Recital 5 of the Dublin III Regulation.

Learning Objectives:

- To understand the structure and the legal basis of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) · To learn the key aspects and criticisms of the Dublin III Regulation
- To critically analyse the proposal by the European Commission to set up a Dublin IV regulation
- To understand the level of implementation of the Dublin III regulation throughout the EU Member States

Class no. 2 Freedom of movement and migration law: the Schengen and the Dublin systems

Lecturer: Prof.ssa Chiara Favilli, University of Firenze, Italy

Class Description:

One of the purposes of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is avoiding secondary movements of asylum seekers and refugees. This overarching aim is pursued through two main tools: harmonisation of national asylum systems and definition of common criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining applications for international protection. However, none of these tools has proved effective and secondary movements have been always occurring during last fifteen years, with a substantial increase since 2013. However, in an area of free movement people may cross internal borders without checks so that it is practically impossible to keep people staying in one country. Against this framework, during the migrants and asylum crisis Member States have reintroduced internal border checks according to the Schengen Borders Code. The Commission has even adopted a Recommendation allowing borders controls for a period up to two years. Furthermore, a reform proposal has been adopted by the Commission, allowing Member States to reintroduce internal borders checks more easily. The same sequence of events that took place when around sixty thousand migrants landed to Italy during the Arab Spring in 2011.

Learning Objectives:

- To understand the links between the Dublin and the Schengen System
- To learn the key rules of the Schengen Borders Code
- To assess the measures adopted by Member States since 2014
- To analyse the reform proposal submitted by the European Commission

Class no. 3 Migrants' rights in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice

Lecturer: prof. Sara De Vido, Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Italy

Class Description:

The purpose of this class is to reflect on two recent judgments of the European Court of Justice, namely X. and X. v. Belgium, and Al Chodor, both decided in March 2017, which show

a clear difference in the position of the Court concerning the application of human rights to migrants outside and inside the borders of the EU. The first case concerned Syrian migrants who had applied for humanitarian visas at the Belgian embassy in Lebanon. The Court argued that, since the applications for visas on humanitarian grounds were made with a view to applying for asylum in Belgium and thereafter being granted a residence permit with 24 a period of validity exceeding 90 days, the applications fell entirely within the scope of national law, and that the provisions of the Charter do not apply to it. The Court departed from the opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, who invoked the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the non-refoulement principle to support his argument that the values of the European Union should be protected both within the territory of the EU member states as well as in their relations with third states. *Al Chodor* refers to the conditions of detention of asylum seekers pending a transfer to another Member State. The Court was asked whether Article 2 (n) and Article 28 (2) of the Dublin III Regulation must be interpreted as requiring Member States to establish, in a national law, objective criteria underlying the reasons for believing that an applicant for international protection who is subject to a transfer procedure may abscond. In this case, the Court ruled that the objective criteria to define a 'risk of absconding' must be established in a binding provision of general application. In the absence of that, Article 28(2) is inapplicable and detention on this ground must be declared unlawful. The Court affirmed the primacy of Human Rights law in EU asylum law implementation.

Learning objectives:

1. To understand the role of the European Court of Justice in the application of European migration law.
2. To link international migration law to human rights law
3. To reflect on the application of the rights enshrined in the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU
4. To critically analyse the position of the Court in two different situations, one concerning migrants inside, the other concerning migrants outside the EU.

Unit References:

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UNIT 3 – INTEGRATION & INCLUSION ISSUES

Class no. 1, Integration and Inclusion Issues

Lecturer: Dr. Marilena Sinigaglia, Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Italy

Class Description:

This class focuses on the key issues of integration and social inclusion with regard to the UNHCR Note on the Integration of Refugees in the European Union but also to the recent social sciences and social work's achievements. In particular, different models and approaches of social workers dealing with immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, will be proposed. On the basis of a Human Rights-based approach the class will analyze in depth the relevance of social justice issues as well as the increasing needs of advocacy. Social workers act with immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers to build up their awareness of both international and local laws; at the same time, they pursue integration and inclusion matter with institutions, civil society, charities and volunteers. The issue of enjoyment of human and citizenship rights is strictly connected to the effective possibilities to access to social and health systems, the knowledge of the host country's language and the migrant's awareness of his/her own rights and obligations in order to engage in any society. Social work efforts are finalised to promote 27 independent living of refugees and their courage to shoulder responsibilities. From this point of view an ecological framework is necessary to keep together macro, meso and micro migration issues. The class introduces to the meaning and the tools of community care and care by the community developing multidimensional solidarity, conflict mediation and cross cultural work. A good networking is necessary to communicate from institutional, volunteers, NGO and migrants point of views in order to achieve good level of integration and inclusion. With reference to the crisis management response, also, the first phase of hosting is meant as a crucial moment of refugee and asylum seeker's project of life.

Learning Objectives:

1. To understand the most important elements in refugee and migrant people's social integration;
2. To learn how to analyze social work models and approaches to deal with immigration;
3. To develop competences understanding migrant projects to achieve autonomy and to fight against handouts.

Class no. 2, Best practices of integration

Lecturer: Dr. Bonesso Gianfranco, Expert, Project Manager, City of Venice Immigration and Asylum Center, Italy

Class Description:

This class concerns best practices based on professional and NGO experiences on dealing with migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. Each best practice is analyzed taking into account social, economic and institutional context features, organizational routines, history and migratory route, personal characteristics of refugee people to carry out a multidimensional assessment of needs. Another issue, concerning person as a whole, is to find key aspects of interventions like flexibility, listening to her specific need coping to personal crisis and social emergency, how person could be resilient after migration trauma. Best practices are referred to Conceptual Framework Defining Core Domains of Integration and Cohesion. The class particularly stresses employment, settlement, education and health issues. The Class aims to propose best practices concerning different ways of hosting by the local community but also related to micro-projects finalized to entry into employment, combating illiteracy through new technologies, cross-cultural education and changes, etc .

Learning Objectives:

1. To make a multi-dimensional assessment of refugee social, relational and personal needs;
2. To understand correlation between best practices and social context features;
3. To develop competences to learn from experiences.

Class no. 3, Case Studies: a practical approach to integration

Lecturers: Bonesso Gianfranco, Marilena Sinigaglia

Class Description:

This class concerns case studies illustrating the civic and social work that is necessary to support migrant social integration projects. The students will listen to life stories of migrants. The class, also, aims to simulate critical situations to support the student learning strategies to face different emergency situations, to develop networking competences to deal with several actors, to understand refugees' profound distress. The class aims to demonstrate the effective implementation of social integration models and best practices illustrated in class 1st and 2nd.

Learning Objectives:

1. To enable students to use both practical skills and theoretical knowledge
2. To understand migration complexity
3. To learn the importance of hearing migrant's point of view and his/her personal suffering, needs, resources.

Unit References:



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4TH MODULE - ENERGY CHALLENGES & DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EASTERN

MEDITERRANEAN COORDINATOR: DR. PAVLOS I. KOKTSIDIS (UCY)

1. INTRODUCTION TO THE MODULE:

Energy has become a major ‘strategic commodity’ in the formulation of country strategies in the Eastern Mediterranean. Given the ongoing concerns about energy security, countries are grappling to situate their energy policies in the broader context of their national strategies while the European Union is seeking to ensure its energy supplies. The module examines the intersection between international security, political, legal, and energy issues, exploring not only how countries shape their strategies to meet their energy needs, but also how such actions have implications for the EU and the regional and international systems. The module equips students with the knowledge and skills to develop a well-rounded understanding of the interaction between energy, security, law and politics, the interdependence and geo-strategic importance of international, regional and domestic developments, and their impact on Eastmed states and the EU.

UNIT 1 – ENERGY DISCOVERIES & ENERGY NETWORKS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Lecturers: Prof. Costas Constantinou & Dr. Pavlos Koktsidis

Unit Description:

What is the “geopolitics of energy”? How has the idea of energy security evolved? The unit introduces students to the recent energy discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean (Cyprus, Israel, Egypt), examines the ‘resource realities’ in the region and discusses the prospects of alternative energy routes reaching Europe. The discovery of significant oil and gas deposits in the exclusive economic zones of Israel, Egypt and Cyprus and the alleged deposits in Greece and other states could potentially provide an additional energy source outside the former Soviet space and the Middle East proper and therefore contribute to the diversification of Europe’s energy suppliers.

Class 1: The concept of energy security

Class 2: The nexus between politics and energy in the EastMed region

Class 3: Energy Discoveries in Eastern Mediterranean

Learning Objectives:

- Gain a greater understanding of energy discoveries and developments in the region
- Identify and analyze how countries have altered their foreign policies and military strategies in light of emerging security concerns
- Anticipate new energy supply patterns and structural shifts in the international and European environment

Unit References



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Karakasis, Vasileios P. (2015) Energy Security and the Cyprus Question: "Securitization" of Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal, 27, pp.5-35

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UNIT 2 – EU ASPECTS & IMPLICATIONS

Lecturers: Prof. Costas Constantinou & Dr. Pavlos Koktsidis

Unit Description:

How important are the eastern Mediterranean gas and oil discoveries for European energy security? Large natural gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean have raised hopes that the region could serve EU energy needs, helping it to fulfil its goals of energy diversification, security, and resilience. This unit focuses on the energy concerns, aspirations and strategic involvement of the EU in the eastern Mediterranean. The unit explains how energy resources in the Eastmed create prospects, and specifies the kind of initiatives Europe has taken in order to forward its strategic goals in the region. It also examines what tensions and threats EU's aspirations and strategic involvement poses to different actors in the region and beyond.

Class 1: Energy-reliance and supply risks

Class 2: EU Energy Security Strategy

Class 3: Strategic Projects of Common Interest

Learning Objectives:

- a) Identify the risks for Europe's energy supply in a complex environment 32
- b) Understand the EU's energy security strategy
- c) The policy initiatives promoted by the EU in the region and their wider implications

Unit References:

Vimont, Pierre (2016). The strategic interests of the European Union. Carnegie Europe.

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UNIT 3 – LEGAL & SECURITY ASPECTS & IMPLICATIONS

Lecturers: Prof. Costas Constantinou & Dr. Pavlos Koktsidis

Unit Description:

This unit examines the legal and security aspects and implications concerning the exploitation of energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. The unit introduces students to the basic legal concepts and practices regarding the delimitation of territorial sea, exclusive economic

zone or continental shelf. It also explains the security measures and reactions stimulated by regional antagonisms concerning ownership, protection and exploitation of resources. Concepts are discussed through the lens of strategic competition, the 'politicization of resources', and the management of conflict. Class 1: Legal Dimension: The delimitation of territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the Eastmed. Class 2: Security Dimension: Strategic Competition and the politicization of resources Class 3: Managing Conflict over Energy Resources in the Eastmed.

Learning Objectives:

1. Understand the major legal parameters of maritime delimitation
2. Identify and critically assess the diplomatic and security strategies of regional actors
3. Encourage the adoption of creative thinking in conflict resolution and cooperation

Unit References:

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